What determines how top managers value their executive stock options? We explore this question empirically by using a unique survey data set which combines subjective option valuation data with a wide set of individual-level variables. Inconsistent with the predictions of theory, individuals in our data set substantially overvalue the options they receive. Optimism and overconfidence (miscalibration) measures are significantly related to option values, whilst measures of risk aversion show no relationship. When managers are very optimistic about company stock they attribute higher values to their options. This finding is consistent with the implicit assumption in Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2007) and Malmendier et al. (2007) . These papers assume that managers who overestimate future stock prices value their options higher and exercise at later points. We also find that less overconfident (miscalibrated) managers put higher values on their options.
Introduction and Motivation
Recent academic research has provided many theoretical and empirical insights relating to compensation with executive stock options (ESOs). Issues receiving attention in research have included the reasons for using stock options, the effects of ESOs on firm performance, the economic costs of options and whether stock options provide opportunities for manipulation or the use of insider information.
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Despite current progress in the understanding of how stock options work, there is still relatively little empirical evidence about how managers and employees subjectively value the stock options they are holding. Core, Guay and Larcker (2003) therefore conclude in their widely cited survey on equity-based compensation that "an interesting question for future research is to examine how executives actually value their stock options."
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The lack of empirical research on ESO values is largely due to widespread data limitations. If one really wants to understand these valuations, one simultaneously needs information about subjective option values and about individual characteristics (such as risk aversion, loss aversion or stockholdings). Unsurprisingly, companies rarely give researchers the opportunity to ask their managers and employers questions about their personal option valuations and their individual traits (for instance, their forecasts regarding company stock). This dearth of data has regrettably meant that many of the potentially valuable theoretical and practical insights to be gained from studying subjective option valuations have remained hidden from view.
The accounting costs of stock option programs, for instance, crucially depend on how 1 Reviews covering these topics are provided by Murphy (1999) , Core et al. (2003) .
2 Core et al. (2003), p. 43. individuals value and, as a consequence of this valuation, exercise their options.
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Existing accounting rules allow firms to adjust the costs of stock options to account for early exercise decisions. Firms can employ, for example, modified valuation models that use, as an input parameter, the expected time until exercise instead of the original time to maturity for valuing granted options (see Hull and White, 2004) . Ignoring undervaluations of options and early exercises would result in adverse effects on firms' reported earnings due to an overestimation of the ESO programs' accounting costs. Economic models of stock option compensation assume that individuals understand how the incentive effects of stock options work and how the value of option packages is determined. But if option holders do not understand the basics underlying stock option plans (for example, if they systematically misprice options), then it is likely that the incentive effects of stock options will not work as intended (see Core et al., 2003) . Heterogeneous and possibly incorrect option valuations have further ramifications for the general efficiency of stock options as a compensation device. If some individuals heavily discount option values while others value them highly, then efficient contracting suggests that individuals with low option valuations should rather be remunerated with other compensation forms that produce lower costs for the issuing firm. To assess the efficiency of option compensation, an estimate of individuals' subjective option values is therefore needed.
3 Note that exercise decisions of individuals and their subjective option values are related as individuals that place lower values on their option holdings will also exercise at earlier points in time (see below for details). 4 Recall that new accounting rules require firms to expense the costs of ESO plans. See IFRS 2 "Share-based Payment" for IAS/IFRS and FAS 123R for US-GAAP.
Understanding the link between subjective option valuation (and the resulting exercise behavior) and individual characteristics is also important from a corporate finance perspective. A recent literature, pioneered by Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2007) and Malmendier et al. (2007) , uses the timing of option exercises as a proxy for managerial overconfidence (hereby defined as the overestimation of mean future stock prices). This measure of overconfidence is later used to explain corporate investment decisions, M&A activity and capital structure choices. The methodology used by Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2007) and Malmendier et al. (2007) implicitly assumes that managers who overestimate their abilities to increase the stock price will value their stock options higher. As a result of that, they will eventually also exercise at later points in time. Whether or not this assumption is justified, however, has not been tested yet due to a lack of data.
Recent research by Bergman and Jenter (2007) and Oyer and Schaefer (2005) incorporates excessive employee optimism into option compensation frameworks using sentiment stories. They predict that employees generally do not value their options as suggested by existing valuation models and argue that firms grant stock options when their boundedly rational employees are overoptimistic about the firm's stock price. Empirical research on whether overconfidence or optimism really affects the subjective valuation of options is, however, far from mature and survey-based research can be very helpful to understand the effects of managers' expectations on ESO values.
Using a unique survey data set based on a questionnaire distributed to senior top managers in one of Europe's largest corporations, we empirically investigate the option valuations of top managers. In particular, we study to what extent individual characteristics of these managers are correlated with their option valuations. We are not aware of other research papers that can use the kind of data that is available for our analysis. Our main findings are as follows. We document a strong heterogeneity in the values managers place on their options. The average manager in our data set values his stock options substantially above the Black-Scholes value. On average, a manager assigns a value of about 31 Euro to an option with a fair (Black-Scholes) value of about 26 Euro. We find that option values are unrelated with different measures of risk aversion. Our results indicate that optimism and overconfidence (miscalibration) measures are significantly correlated with option values.
More specifically, our evidence suggests that managers who are more optimistic about company stock and the stock market as a whole place higher values on their ESOs. Our results are consistent with the implicit assumption in recent corporate finance papers such as Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2007) and Malmendier et al. (2007) . In these papers it is assumed that managers that overestimate future stock prices put higher values on their stock options and exercise at later points in time. Our finding is also consistent with the sentiment hypothesis presented by Oyer and Schaefer (2005) and Bergman and Jenter (2007) . In addition, we find that more overconfident (miscalibrated) managers place a lower value on their options.
The findings of this paper should certainly not be taken as final and definite as they rely on a study of a single organization. Nevertheless, our analyzes and results are important as they provide a first attempt to narrow the existing gap between theoretical and empirical research on subjective option valuation. Moreover, they give support to a recent line of corporate finance research that assumes that option valuation/exercise decisions and the overestimation of stock prices by managers are related.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the theoretical background and related empirical research that studies the values individuals place on their ESOs. The data set and the methodology are presented in Section 3. Section 4 contains descriptive results, defines the variables and presents summary statistics on individual characteristics. Section 5 studies the determinants of individuals' option values.
Finally, Section 6 summarizes our results and concludes.
2 Theory and Related Literature
Stock Option Valuations: Theory and Predictions
It is well-known that standard option pricing models are not appropriate for determining the value individuals place on their stock options. Economic theory has shown that risk aversion, diversification, and wealth need to be taken into account to explain the option valuations of participants in ESO plans.
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Several theoretical studies hereby explicitly model option values as a function of risk aversion, diversification, and wealth. Examples for these studies are the papers by Lambert, Larcker and Verrecchia (1991) and Hall and Murphy (2000, 2002) which suggest that subjective options values should be decreasing in individuals' risk aversion and company stockholdings but increasing in outside wealth.
Important conclusions from these modelling approaches are (i) that risk averse, undiversified and less wealthy individuals should value their stock options significantly below the Black-Scholes value and (ii) that differences in personal characteristics can lead to significant heterogeneity in option valuations within an organization.
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In line with these 5 Note that option values and exercise decisions are linked as lower individual option values lead to earlier exercise decisions. A stock option will generally be exercised whenever an employee's expected utility from exercising is greater than the expected utility form holding the option for another time period (see Huddart, 1994 , Carpenter, 1998 or Bettis et al., 2005 .
6 Bettis et al. (2005) and Hemmer et al. (1996) have shown that exercise decisions and hence also option values further depend on firm characteristics such as dividend payments or stock price volatilities. We disregard these aspects as we do not study a cross-section of firms but rather focus on heterogeneity in individual-level variables within one organization. studies, Sautner and Weber (2006) argue that individuals with a highly firm-specific human capital will also discount option values more heavily as their human capital is less diversified.
Beyond these four variables, a set of other individual characteristics has also been linked to option valuations. Massey (2003) , for example, argues that more loss averse individuals should exhibit lower option valuations. He argues that loss aversion causes employees to put more weight on potential losses than on potential gains.
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As stock options can either appreciate or decrease in value relative to a certain reference point (e.g. relative to past exercise gains), more loss averse individuals will consider the lottery structure implied in options as less attractive and hence discount option values more heavily. ESO values may also vary across managers because of differences in the individual level of optimism (see Malmendier and Tate, 2005 , Malmendier et al., 2007 , Oyer and Schaefer, 2005 and Bergman and Jenter, 2007 . Optimistic managers believe that future stock returns are higher than they actually are. As option valuations are an increasing function of the underlying stock price, overoptimistic managers should place higher values on their stock options compared to their less optimistic colleagues.
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Managers that are overconfident (miscalibrated) assign confidence intervals to their estimates of future stock prices (e.g. of the own firm) that are too tight. Overconfidence then has two simultaneous but reverse effects on option values. On the one hand, overconfidence reduces the subjective value put on an option as the convexity of an option's payoff is undervalued. On the other hand, it also increases value as the risk that is underlying an 7 See Kahnemann and Tversky (1979).
8 Evidence suggesting that people regularly believe that more favorable events occur more often than they actually do can be found in Weinstein (1980) or Ito (1990) . option is underestimated (see Henderson, 2005) . Which of these two effects actually dominates and whether overconfidence overall has a positive or negative effect on subjective option values is therefore an empirical question. Massey (2003) uses prospect theory to argue that narrow bracketing can also affect option values. He claims that an individual that does not integrate his stock options into his total wealth, i.e. suffers from narrow bracketing, will consider ESOs as less attractive and will therefore lower his subjective valuation of a given option package. Myopia is related to the concept of narrow bracketing as it can be considered as a form of narrow bracketing over time. One can therefore expect that individuals with very myopic perspectives concerning stock price changes will regard ESOs as less attractive compared to less myopic Overall, economic arguments hence predict that subjective option valuations should significantly depend on individuals' risk aversion, stockholdings, wealth, firm-specificity of human capital, loss aversion, optimism, overconfidence (miscalibration), narrow bracketing, myopia, and the frequency by which potential exercise gains are supervised. Table   1 summarizes the predicted relationships between these characteristics and ESO values.
Hereby, "+" means that a model or theory predicts an increase in the subjective option value with an increase in the respective variable. "-" likewise means that a model or theory predicts a decrease in the subjective option value with an increase in the variable. "?" means that no testable prediction is possible ex ante.
Related Empirical Literature on Stock Option Valuations
Surprisingly, only few studies empirically investigate how individual managers and employees actually value the stock options they are holding. This is mainly due to the prevalent reservation of most firms with respect to questionnaires on their own ESO plans. Existing studies therefore try to circumvent this problem by surveying students or newsletter readers with questions on non-existing and virtual stock options. Lambert and (2005) is based on a survey conducted with university students. In line with Lambert and Larcker, they asked their subjects how much money they would require to exchange an imaginary stock option. They also provide evidence suggesting that individuals value ESOs substantially above the Black-Scholes value. Most closely related to our work is a study by Massey (2003) . He looks at the determinants of subjective option values for a real option program of a Fortune 100 firm. Massey finds that risk aversion and stock price expectations are significantly related to option values: more risk averse and less optimistic employees place lower values on their ESOs. Moreover, he documents that loss aversion and mental accounting are negatively correlated with individuals' option values. Our paper differs from Massey (2003) in that we focus on top managers rather than employees in a broad-based stock option plan. Moreover, we are able to use a wider set of individual-level variables compared to Massey (we can use, for example, information on managerial overconfidence which is of particular interest in a study on top managers). A recent paper by Farrell et al. (2006) looks at the impact of educational training programs on option valuations and finds that perceived option values are positively affected by education on the functioning of stock options.
The Data Set and the Institutional Set-Up
Our data set contains individual-level certainty equivalents for real and unvested stock options that were granted in March 2003. Using confidential paper-based questionnaires, we directly asked all 182 top managers of our sample company on the value they subjectively put on one of these stock options. Our data set further comprises comprehensive information on a wide set of manager-specific characteristics such as risk aversion, tenure or stock price expectations. We received a total of 77 survey responses yielding in a response rate of 42.31%. The survey was conducted in March and April 2005 (with one reminder).
To avoid strategic and untruthful answering, we assured that all survey responses are treated confidentially. In particular, we guaranteed that neither the executive board nor the human resources department of the firm will be able to access the individual survey responses.
The individuals in our data set comprise the second (n = 19), third (n = 51) and fourth (n = 112) management level of the sample firm.
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Seven managers of the second, 23 of the 9 The company did not enable us to contact the executive board members (i.e. the first management level).
third, and 47 of the fourth level returned the questionnaires. The company that provided the option data is a member of the blue chip index Euro Stoxx 50. It is one of the largest in its industry worldwide and employs more than 80,000 people. The vesting period of the options we investigate ended in May 2005 , and the subsequent exercise period runs until June 2011. To avoid insider conflicts, the company designed four closed periods per year within which options are not exercisable at all. Closed periods were set around calendar dates were quarterly or annual earnings are published. Each closed period encompasses two to six weeks.
We are aware that studies using survey data have natural shortcomings such as potential non-responses biases, biases resulting from differences in the interpretations of questions, or the problem of not measuring actions but beliefs.
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Given that executive stock options are not traded and prices non-existent, we, however, think that the use of survey data is a promising way to get a better understanding of subjective option valuations and their determinants. In particular, we think that the possibility to ask senior managers on how they personally value a fully-fledged real stock option provides an exciting basis to address our research questions and outweighs potential survey shortcomings. 
Descriptive Results on Subjective Option Valuations
To get a general idea on how the managers in our data set value their option holdings, we asked each individual for the certainty equivalent of one of his outstanding and unvested stock options (see Question B in the attached questionnaire). Table 2 Figure 1 . The numbers show that, even though we observe a strong general tendency to overvalue options, there is a lot of heterogeneity within the organization. Interestingly, there is also evidence that suggests that some managers severely discount the value of their options. Overall, our finding is in line with related empirical research that also documents this overvaluation effect (see Lam-bert and Larcker, 2001 , Hodge et al., 2005 and Massey 2003 . Note that our evidence is highly inconsistent with prevalent economic models that suggests that individuals should value stock options significantly below its Black-Scholes value as they are inherently undiversified (see, e.g., Lambert et al., 1991) . Our results on the large heterogeneity of the elicited option values are important from an efficient contracting view. Efficient contracting suggests that individuals with low option valuations should rather be remunerated with other compensation forms that produce lower costs for the issuing firm (holding the incentive effects constant). Our results therefore imply that the sample firm could lower its compensation costs by having a better understanding on how their managers value granted stock options.
Descriptive Statistics on Individual Characteristics
To identify the variables of interest that are related to subjective option values, we used the arguments and predictions that were derived in Section 2. These variables will later be linked with the ascertained option values. Table 3 summarizes and defines the variables that are used in the subsequent empirical analysis.
Risk Aversion 1 measures a manager's self-reported degree of risk aversion (see Question C1 in the attached questionnaire). Individuals had to divide a given amount of money, 1,000,000 Euro, between a risky lottery 12 and a risk-free investment (safe return of 3%).
The response range was between 0% (if everything was invested in the safe asset) and 100% (if everything was invested in the risky lottery). Clearly, the lower the proportion of wealth that is invested in the risky asset, the higher the degree of individual risk aversion.
12 50% probability that the investment increases by 30% and 50% probability that it decreases by 20%.
For the subsequent analysis, we classify answers below (equal to and above) the median response as high (low). Risk Aversion 2 captures a manager's degree of risk aversion based on the certainty-equivalent method (see Question C2).
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The lower the elicited certainty equivalent, the higher the degree of risk aversion. We again classify answers below (equal to and above) the median response as high (low). Stockholdings is the ratio of the value of an individual's company stockholdings to his total wealth (answers in %) (see Question A1). Responses below (equal to and above) the median response are classified as low (high). Wealth measures a manager's total wealth. We proxy wealth by the management level of an employee in the corporation. We classify individuals at the second and third management level as high, and those at the fourth level as low. Following May (1995) and Degeorge et al. (2004) , we use tenure as a proxy for the firm-specificity of human capital (see Question D). Firm-specificity of Human Capital is hence measured by the number of years an individual has been working for the option granting company. We classify answers below (equal to and above) the median response as low (high).
Loss Aversion reflects an individuals's degree of loss aversion based on a stated certainty equivalent for a mixed lottery (see Question C3). Lower certainty equivalents hereby imply a lower degree of loss aversion.
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We categorized answers into groups ranging from 1 to 4, with lower values indicating a lower degree of loss aversion. Answers below the median response were classified as low (low degree of loss aversion), and those equal to and above the median response as high (high degree of loss aversion). 13 We elicited certainty equivalents based on a lottery that provides a 50% chance of winning an amount equal to 1,000,000
Euro and a 50% chance of winning nothing.
14 To measure loss aversion, individuals had to decide on the participation or non-participation in a set of pre-specified lotteries. These lotteries had a 50% chance of a loss equal to 100,000 Euro and a 50% chance of a gain equal to X. We varied X between 25,000 Euro and 300,000 Euro. Confidence intervals were again calculated using the methodology suggested by DeBondt (1998). We classify answers below (equal to and above) the median response as high (low).
A manager's degree of wealth integration is captured by Narrow Bracketing (see Question A3). Individuals responded on a five-point scale with the endpoints "1 = no wealth inte-15 If the current stock price is, for example, 10 Euro and a manager expects an upper bound of 13 and a lower bound of 8, our overconfidence measure would be (13 − 8)/10 * 100 = 50. gration" and "5 = high level of wealth integration" to a question about their degree of narrow bracketing. Higher values hereby imply a lower degree of narrow bracketing. We classify answers below three (equal to and above) as high (low). We further measured how far individuals look ahead with respect to stock price changes and option values (Myopia).
They responded on a six-point scale with the endpoints "1 = less than a week" and "6 = more than two years" (see Question A4). Answers below (above) two years are classified as high (low). Frequency Supervision finally measures how often an employee checks the exercise gains he can realize by exercising.
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The managers responded on a seven-point scale with the endpoints "1 = several times a day" and "7 = less than once a month" (see Question A5). We consider answers below (equal to and above) 5 as high (low).
Summary statistics on our set of individual characteristics are provided in Table 4 . Apart from the variables defined above, the table also includes information on the fraction of total wealth invested in equity (Ratio Equity), and on the fraction of equity holdings invested in company stock (Ratio Company Stock ). The table shows that the average individual invested 36.19% in the risky lottery (Risk Aversion 1 ). The mean certainty equivalent for a 50% chance of winning 1,000,000 Euro and a 50% chance of winning nothing was 258,571 Euro (Risk Aversion 2 ). On average, managers in our sample invested 7.51% of their total wealth in company stock (median = 5.25%, std.dev. = 7.86%). As a fraction of his overall equity holdings, the average option holder has a considerable investment in company stock (41.88%). This figure displays that most individuals in our data set are highly undiversified. Their investment strategies contrast the recommendations given by Markowitz (1952) and Sharpe (1964) who suggest that people should hold well-diversified 16 The company offered a web page where all managers can regularly check the gains they would realize by exercising.
portfolios.
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Most people have been working for the company for a period of more than 20 years, which even deteriorates their diversification problems. The mean (median) value of tenure, our proxy for the Firm-specificity of Human Capital, is 22.74 years (24.00 years).
The people in our sample seem to be very loss averse on average: the mean value of our categorial variable for loss aversion is equal to 3.31.
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The average individual predicted a company stock return of 22.67% over the five-year horizon, with responses varying heavily between -28.90% and 77.75% (Optimism Company). Expected returns for the market index DAX (Optimism Market) turned out to be of similar size, with a mean value of 23.84% and a minimum (maximum) of -31.46% (82.77%). The average confidence interval is 45.34% for company stock (Overconfidence Company) and 50.30% for the DAX (Overconfidence Market). Most managers suffer from Narrow Bracketing and do not integrate their financial wealth (median = 2.00, mean 2.37). The median option holder looks less than two years ahead with respect to stock price changes and option values (Myopia), and checks his potential exercise gains several times a month (Frequency Supervision). Table 5 presents pairwise correlations between our collected individual characteristics.
It shows that our measures of risk aversion are consistent in the sense that higher risk aversion in the self-reporting treatment is significantly associated with higher risk aversion in the certainty equivalent treatment. Furthermore, we find that a higher degree of risk aversion (according to both risk measures) is also associated with a higher degree of loss aversion.
17 Recent research by Meulbroek (2002) has explicitly shown how considerable the costs of such an insufficient diversification can be. Further evidence for non-diversification by employees can be found in the 401(k) literature, see Benartzi (2001) or Huberman and Sengmüller (2004) among others.
Empirical Results on Determinants of Subjective Option Valuations
Having looked at the elicited option values and the individual-level variables in our data set, we now formally investigate the heterogeneity in option valuations within our data set. we do not perform multivariate analyzes, the correlation matrix in Table 5 do not suggest that our optimism and overconfidence results are driven by a third variable.
Contrary to our prediction, we find no evidence suggesting that narrow bracketing and myopia are related to option values. The coefficient estimate of the frequency by which individuals supervise their exercise gains is, however, significantly correlated with option valuations. The more heavily the managers in our data set checked their potential exercise gains, the higher they value their option packages. Table 7 complements the results in Table 6 Table 3 .
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The findings reinforce our conclusion that our measures of risk aversion only poorly explain the observed variation in option values in our data. The difference is neither economically large nor statistically significant for the two risk aversion groups. Individuals who are optimistic about company stock value their option with 32.17 Euro, while less optimistic managers 20 Note that the analysis in Table 7 uses less information than the correlation analysis in Table 6 . It is therefore not surprising that some variables turned out to be significant in the correlation analysis but not in grouping analysis.
placed an average value of only 28.65 Euro on their ESOs. The results for our overconfidence variables confirm the general conclusions we drew on the basis of the correlation analysis in Table 6 .
Conclusion
Stock option programs constitute an important economic concern for issuing companies and for their employees. Little is known, however, about how individuals value their stock option packages. The absence of research has been sustained by data limitations concerning individual-level subjective option values. We have studied how top managers personally value their options and what the determinants of these option valuations are.
To perform these tasks, we were able to use a unique data set combining survey-based subjective option values and detailed personal characteristics on a wide set of economic variables.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. When individuals were asked how they subjectively value a real stock option in their portfolio, they reported values that were substantially in excess of the Black-Scholes option value. The average manager assigned a value of about 31 Euro to an option with a fair value of roughly 26 Euro. Our survey data suggested that the managers in our data set are highly undiversified with almost 42% of their equity holdings invested in company stock. The average individual predicted a company stock return of 22.67% over a five-year horizon with responses varying heavily between -28.90% and 77.75%. Moreover, most of the managers suffered from narrow bracketing and were very loss averse.
As to how individual characteristics affect option values, we found no statistically signif-icant relationship between option values and measures of risk aversion. We found that optimism and overconfidence measures were significantly related to option valuations.
Managers that are very optimistic about company stock seem to place higher values on their ESOs. Our results are consistent with the implicit assumption in recent corporate finance papers such as Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2007) and Malmendier et al. (2007) .
These papers assume that managers who overestimate future stock prices put higher values on their stock options and exercise at later points in time. Our finding is also consistent with the sentiment hypothesis presented by Oyer and Schaefer (2005) and Bergman and Jenter (2007) . Their models suggested that excessive optimism causes individuals to overvalue ESOs. Consistent with Henderson (2005) and Sautner and Weber (2006), we also found that more overconfident managers assign lower values to their stock options. 
Characteristics
This table reports predicted relationships between various individual characteristics and subjective stock option values. "+" means that a model or theory predicts an increase in the subjective option valuation with an increase in the variable. "-" means that a model or theory predicts a decrease in the subjective option valuation with an increase in the variable. "?" means that no prediction is possible.
Variable Predicted Sign
Risk Aversion -
Stockholdings -
Wealth +
Firm-specificity of Human Capital -
Loss Aversion -
Optimism +
Overconfidence ? 
Narrow Bracketing -
Myopia -
Frequency Supervision
Risk Aversion 1
Measures a manager's self-reported degree of risk aversion. We classify answers below (equal to and above) the median response as high (low).
Risk Aversion 2
Measures a manager's degree of risk aversion based on the certainty-equivalent method. We classify answers below (equal to and above) the median response as high (low).
Stockholdings
Is defined as the ratio of the value of a manager's company stockholdings to his total wealth. We classify answers below (equal to and above) the median response as low (high).
Wealth
Measures a manager's wealth. We proxy wealth by the grade of an employee in the company. We classify employees at the second and third management level as high, and those at the fourth level as low.
Firm-specificity of
Measures a manager's firm-specificity of human capital. We proxy it by the number of years an employee has been working for the company.
Human Capital
We classify answers below (equal to and above) the median response as low (high).
Loss Aversion
Measures a manager's degree of loss aversion based on a stated certainty equivalent for a mixed lottery. We classify answers below the median response as low (low degree of loss aversion), and those equal to and above the median response as high (very loss averse)
Optimism Company
Measures a manager's degree of optimism based on a forecasting question about the expected return of company stock over a five-year horizon.
Overconfidence Company
Measures a manager's degree of overconfidence (miscalibration) based on a question concerning upper and lower bounds for the price level of company stock over a five-year horizon. Confidence intervals are calculated as the difference between the high forecast and the low forecast, divided by the stock price level at the date of forecast multiplied by 100. We classify answers below (equal to and above) the median response as high (low).
Optimism Market
Measures a manager's degree of optimism based on a forecasting question about the expected return for the German stock market index DAX over a five-year horizon. We classify answers below (equal to and above) the median response as low (high).
Overconfidence Market
Measures a manager's degree of overconfidence (miscalibration) based on a question concerning upper and lower bounds of the index level of the German stock market index DAX over a five-year horizon. Confidence intervals are calculated as the difference between the high forecast and the low forecast, divided by the index level at the date of forecast multiplied by 100. We classify answers below (equal to and above) the median response as high (low).
Narrow Bracketing
Measures a manager's degree of wealth integration. Managers responded on a five-point scale with the endpoints "1 = no wealth integration" and "5 = high level of wealth integration". We classify answers below three (equal to and above) as high (low).
Myopia
Measures how far a manager looks ahead with respect to stock price changes and option values. Employees responded on a six-point scale with the endpoints "1 = less than a week" and "6 = more than two years". We classify answers below (above) two years as high (low).
Frequency Supervision
Measures how often a manager checks the potential exercise gains of his stock options. Employees responded on a seven-point scale with the endpoints "1 = several times a day" and "7 = less than once a month". We classify answers below (equal to and above) 5 as high (low). This table presents pairwise correlations between the set of individual-level characteristics. It further includes the number of observations used in calculating the correlation coefficient. * indicates significance at 10%, ** indicates significance at 5%, *** indicates significance at 1%.
(1)
(8)
(10) The statements should be made such that the correct index level/market price (for instance in the first question, the value of the Deutsche Aktienindex DAX in five years) should... … with a high probability (95%) not fall short of the Lower Bound (i.e. with 95% probability, it should be above your lower bound) … should equally likely be above respectively below the Estimate (i.e. with a probability of 50% it should not be below your Estimate and with a probability of 50% it should not be above your Estimate)
… with a high probability (95%) not exceed the Upper Bound (i.e. with 95% probability, it should be below your Upper Bound) Please imagine the following situation:
You can invest money in a lottery (a risky investment). The invested amount of money can either increase in value by 30% or decrease in value by 20%. Both outcomes have a probability of 50%.
Alternatively, you can also invest your money in a risk-free asset. The money invested there will for sure appreciate in value by 3%.
You have 1,000,000 Euro to invest.
How much would you invest in such a situation in the lottery (risky investment) and how much in the risk-free asset?
Please indicate you answer on the following scale (from 0 to 100). Hereby, 0 means that you invest all the money in the risk-free asset and 100 means that you invest all the money in the lottery. 
C2.) Question 2:
In the following situation, you can choose between a lottery and a sure payment.
The lottery pays out either 1,000,000 Euro or 0 Euro. Each outcome has a probability of 50%.
The sure payment varies between 100,000 Euro and 900,000 Euro. 
C3.) Question 3:
In the following situation, you can choose between participation and non-participation in a set of prespecified lotteries.
In case of participation in the lottery, you lose 100,000 Euro with a probability of 50% and win an amount equal to X Euro with the same probability. The amount X varies between 25,000 Euro and 300,000 Euro.
In case of non-participation, your wealth does not change.
Please mark for all values of X whether or not you want to participate in the lottery (please mark). 
